Water resource management is a contentious issue in contemporary Brazil. Urbanisation and the growth of regional economic nodes across Brazil has increased demands for food and energy. As such, the expansion of the agricultural sector and the country-wide reliance on hydropower contributes to issues of water scarcity within cities. Though a large proportion of Brazil’s population has adequate access to clean water, 6.8% of the population has no access to water entirely (Britto et al. 2016).

To give you an idea of water scarcity problems in Rio, some residents in the Pica-Pau favela have to source water from a drainage channel that leads to Guanabara Bay (Healy and Norris 2016). Inadequate supplies of clean water are most prominent in the favelas and periphery areas across Rio de Janeiro, where available data shows only 37.17% of residents have access to clean water. There have been significant issues with poor filtration of water, with residents recently reporting water being ‘murky and smelly’ (Phillips 2020). These spaces of inadequate water access are symptomatic of poor managerial oversight by relevant municipal bodies over the implementation of public-private projects, who see water as a political and economic commodity rather than a basic social need.

As a crucial form of promoting sustainable regional development, effective water resource management is key to addressing socio-political inequalities of access. Water management policies in Rio often involves implementing new projects rather than improving existing infrastructure. Arguably, the inequalities between cariocas is reproduced through policies intending to tackle mounting issues of water scarcity and poor sanitation (the latter issue will be considered in a later post). This blog will consider the PAC-SERLA project, the actors ascribed roles in policy making and the socio-spatial consequences of defunct water management amongst the cariocas.

In 2007, a new initiative by CEDAE (Rio’s water utility company) and SERLA (the water regulator across the Baixada Fluminense) aimed at re-dredging the Iguaçu river in Nova Iguaçu, one of the contributing rivers to Rio’s water supply, was implemented to improve water sustainability and security. The cost of the project ($135 million) was enough to raise eyebrows, but it was the implications for residents living alongside the Iguaçu river which caused the most controversy (Ioris and Costa 2009). 2300 locals were displaced from the riverside as a result of dredging, and many of those were relocated with minimal consultation and compensation. Some were not even recompensed at all for the loss of their homes and land, with the public bodies behind the initiative arguing that the settlements were informal and thus lacked a reason for reparations.

A lack of oversight by the Guanabara Bay Committee (the committee granted legislation and executive powers over Rio’s water management projects) meant the implications of the Iguaçu restoration project for communities were overlooked. Communities affected by the project were dissatisfied to say the least and this was not helped by the predominant disposition of CEDAE and SERLA to remain unresponsive to public voices.

As Ioris (2011: 140) notes, the case of re-dredging the Iguaçu river in 2007 was another repeat of historical problems with former projects, namely the ‘constant delays, lack of dialogue with civil society, failure to engage the local authorities, and ill-conceived projects that are not easily connected to the existing water infrastructure’.

Furthermore, during the planning phase of the project, investment from the federal development fund (PAC) into Nova Iguaçu region were the third largest across Brazil (Ioris 2011). However, impoverished communities still lacked secure water sources, suggesting that more should’ve been done to improve existing infrastructure within favelas. Commentators also emphasised that the project, under the Bairro-Favela PAC scheme, was a play by politicians to maintain a public image of responsible and fair governance dedicated to sustainable development across Rio.

The lack of community integration into policy consultation over water management brings to question the legitimacy of the actors involved in the process, emphasising ‘the technocratic rationality that conceals or denies the political dimension of water problems’ (Ioris and Costa 2009: 156). Better solutions for water management would consider a bridging of the gap between actors involved and the community, rather than excluding those who already suffer from poorer living standards.

List of references:

Britto, A.L., Formiga-Johnsson, R.M., and P.R.F. Carneiro (2016) ‘Water supply and hydrosocial scarcity in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area’, Ambiente and Sociedade, 19, 1, 185-208.

Healy, M. and S. Norris (2016) ‘After Years of Waiting, Morar Carioca Finally Launched in Pica-Pau’ (WWW) RioOnWatch: RioOnWatch (https://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=28808: February 22 2020)

Ioris, A.A.R. (2012) ‘Applying the Strategic-Relational Approach to Urban Political Ecology: The Water Management Problems of the Baixada Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil’, Antipode, 44, 1, 122-150.

Ioris, A.A.R. and M.A.M. Costa (2009) ‘The Challenge to Revert Unsustainable Trends: Uneven Development and Water Degradation in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area’, Sustainability, 1, 133-160.

Phillips, D. (2020) ‘‘It tastes like clay’: residents of Rio alarmed by murky, smelly tap water’ (WWW) The Guardian: The Guardian (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/16/brazil-rio-de-janeiro-tap-water-pollution: February 22 2020)